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Israel News Digest -- 2001: Peace Or War?

David Dolan, Christian Friends of Israel, Jerusalem
January 2000

The final year of the passing twentieth century was always expected to be a special one in the Lord's unique land. Indeed it has been exceptionally special, but not exactly in the way that many were anticipating. Instead of featuring a record number of Christian tourists celebrating the dawn of a new millennium in the land of the Messiah's birth, the year's central focus has been on the crumbling Arab/Israeli peace process. Negotiations broke down with Syria in March, followed by the failed Israeli-Palestinian Camp David summit in July. In between was the hasty Israeli army withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Then the violent new Palestinian uprising began in late September. The unrest immediately burst whatever was left of optimistic year 2000 tourist expectations, and much more. But the year is ending with renewed peace negotiations--talks that may decide the fate of Jerusalem.

The New Year is debuting with a mixture of fear and slight new hope in the troubled Promised Land. The faint optimism, accompanied by significant trepidation, comes from the renewed negotiations that began the week before Christmas in the United States. The fear comes from the likelihood that the talks will once again lead nowhere, or that a desperate Ehud Barak will work with a fading Bill Clinton to concoct a deal that basically re-divides Jerusalem, and thus the Jewish people. Adding to the anxiety are continuing signs that the Middle East may be heading for a major military showdown in 2001. On top of this, the besieged Prime Minister suddenly resigned on December 9, forcing an early vote for the leading position on February 6. In summary, we have an unstable Israeli government forging a new peace deal in the midst of a violent Palestinian uprising in the shadow of a possible new Mideast war. One thing is certain: All this is hardly a recipe for a dull year ahead!

The Israeli political world was turned upside down by Ehud Barak's surprise resignation announcement. The political wagon had already started to move fast in late November when the Israeli Knesset voted overwhelmingly to hold early national elections sometime next year. While the two big parties, Labor and Likud, were still debating whether the vote should be held in March or May, Barak slammed his premier's cap down on the road. He said he had only consulted in advance with his family and a few close friends before making the pivotal decision, adding to charges that he often acts like a dictator beholding to no one but himself.

Actually, many leading members of his own struggling party had been urging the Premier to unilaterally step down since that would automatically force a snap election for the top spot. Under Israeli law, such an election would leave the current Knesset, with its slight left-wing plurality, in place. They did so with both eyes glued to opinion polls predicting that Labor would "get creamed" in an early Knesset vote. These politicians said that Barak alone should pay for his own mismanagement sins, not the Labor party that he only joined a few years ago. If he somehow beat the odds and won the election, fine. If not, at least he would not take the entire party down with him.

Barak's resignation had another, extremely appealing silver lining. It would probably keep his most powerful potential opponent out of the race. Indeed, that is what most analysts opined was actually behind the dramatic, unforeseen move. Barak knew that former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu could not legally run for office in a snap election since he is not a sitting member of the current Knesset. With polls showing Netanyahu ahead of Barak by at least 15%, it would be a much easier horse race, to say the least, if the former Likud leader was not a competitor on the track.

However, Barak may have overlooked one predictable thing: Almost all media pundits and politicians saw his move as a cynical, if not deplorable, attempt to fix the race in advance. Adding insult to injury, many labeled it the kind of move expected from the man that Barak soundly defeated in the last election! Since the reigning Premier had acted like a frightened--if brainy--little child, many analysts said any race against Netanyahu would leave Israelis with not one, but two egotistical losers to choose from. They added that his rather dismal situation was unfolding at the worst possible time; in the midst of an internal security crisis not seen since 1948, and a growing external war threat in the region.

NETANYAHU BOWS IN AND OUT

In what must have been one of the shortest political comebacks in history, Binyamin Netanyahu went from announcing that he was re-entering the political stage to exiting it in just over one week! He announced on Sunday, December 10 that he felt compelled to throw his hat into the political ring due to the "serious crisis that the state of Israel finds itself in, one of the worst in its history." He blasted his successor in office, saying Ehud Barak had brought on the new Palestinian uprising by his "drastic concessions" at the Camp David summit. The former Israeli leader also denounced the former general for deliberately triggering a narrow election, calling the move "a transparent trick" to keep him from running for office.

However, as noted above, the trick worked. Exactly one week and one day after he announced he was a candidate for Prime Minister, Netanyahu was on his way back to private life--at least for now. His swift reversal of fortune came after the Knesset refused to dissolve itself in the middle of the night on December 19, thus blocking the way for Netanyahu's candidacy unless a special law was passed to permit him to run. Since he had previously made clear he would not enter the race as a result of a last-minute law change, his fate was apparently sealed.

Netanyahu's lightening exit resulted from his calculated decision to only participate in a full general election that would include a vote for a new Knesset, not just an election for premier. His reasoning was quite sound, if temporarily self-defeating: Anti-Netanyahu left-wing parties currently hold 61 out of 120 Knesset seats (Barak's One Israel party has 26, Meretz 10, three Arab parties have 10 seats between them, the Center party 6, Shinui 6, the Russian Democratic Choice 2, and the worker's Am Echad party 2). The former Likud leader would need to stitch together a coalition government involving at least some of his sworn opponents. In theory, he should have been able to count on his one-time foreign minister, David Levy, and his brother Maxim--both current members of Barak's One Israel alliance. But the Levy brothers despise the vibrant Netanyahu, making their participation problematic at best.

The once and maybe future Likud leader was quite right in stating that he could not have effectively governed under such circumstances. Even if Netanyahu had somehow succeeded in wooing over at least three opposition Knesset members--giving him a bare majority coalition--his government would have been overly dependent on the unpredictable whims of the self-absorbed Shas party. Of course, the same holds true for Ariel Sharon, although he would stand a greater chance of persuading the Levy brothers to join his patchwork government. Still, he too could only produce a slight majority government, with no prospect of wooing left wing and centrist politicians who unanimously view Sharon as a right-wing demagogue liable to lead the country to an even more dangerous precipice than it is already facing.

UNITY ON THE WAY

On the other hand, Ehud Barak would also find it quite maddening to form a viable coalition government out of the current Knesset. Indeed, his inability to do so is the precise reason why Israel is facing the February election! Unless he takes on board the 10 Arab Knesset members (an extremely unlikely prospect in the wake of the violent Palestinian uprising), Barak will need at least one right wing or religious partner to cross the magic line--meaning Shas once again.

The Orthodox party would find it no easier to co-exist with the ultra-secular Meretz party than it did when both were part of Barak's first government, to say nothing of cohabiting with the anti-religious Shinui party. Shas is even more reluctant now to be tied to any Barak-led government since the Premier declared in September that he plans to launch a "secular revolution" that would significantly lessen Judaism's influence in everyday Israeli life. Shas leaders and most of their followers find the proposition revolting at best.

The only realistic way out of this apparent conundrum is a national unity government, to be formed by whoever wins the February 6 vote. In fact, there is substantial circumstantial evidence to suggest that Barak and Sharon have already jointly decided on this route. The two men held a private parley just before Barak's resignation notice thundered across the sky. They share an obvious glaring interest in keeping the newly popular "Bibi" Netanyahu out of the race. In the end, the two could work together to pilot Israel through the seemingly tumultuous days ahead in 2001--possibly with Netanyahu's help--and then disband and go to real general elections if and when the ongoing security crisis comes to an end.

The two Israeli political leaders could have avoided this half-hearted and expensive electoral showdown. They could have joined hands in an emergency government long before now, as Barak first proposed in early October. But the PM's left-wing cronies, especially Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin, would not hear of it. They simply refused to sit at a cabinet table with the portly former general, especially if he had any real say in how Israel was governed.

On the other hand, Sharon was stalked by some very right-wing members of his own party who feared he would simply be used as a rubber stamp to approve Barak's weak handling of the violent uprising, or even to paper over further Labor party concessions to the Palestinians. In response to such fears, the Likud leader had stated emphatically that he would not join a unity government unless he was given some sort of veto over its actions and policies, a request that Barak--under intense leftist pressure--had no choice but to turn down.

According to most opinion polls, Sharon's chances of emerging as the head of Israel's next government would have been somewhat reduced if Shimon Peres joined the race for premier. Pundits had a field day with Peres' December 20 declaration that he wanted to be an "independent pro-peace" candidate, noting that the 77 year-old former premier had run and failed so many times that it was hard to keep count (he served as PM in the mid-1980's as part of a "rotation" unity government, and in 1995-96 because of Yitzhak Rabin's untimely death).

The Peres candidacy was even shorter than Netanyahu's. It was shot down a day after he declared his intention to run when he failed to secure the necessary support of ten Knesset members. Many analysts viewed the overnight candidacy as a vainglorious attempt by the distraught and frustrated "peace camp" to pretend that the passing year just did not happen. Opinion polls show that a majority of Israeli voters want a tough right-wing leader at this time, not a man whose policies are widely blamed for the fractured Oslo peace process and the ongoing security crisis. Still, the polls also revealed that Peres had a slightly better chance of defeating Sharon than Barak does, if only because the current PM is rated by many of his former boosters as a dismal failure.

LOOKING OUT FOR NUMBER ONE

Unless Yasser Arafat completely breaks character and quickly gives in on some tightly held negotiating demands, Israeli voters will be going to the polls in the midst of a deadly uprising. Their choice will not be easy. To vote for Barak is seemingly to support continuing attempts to revive the brain-dead Oslo peace process, however futile that might be. It is to place renewed trust in a man that almost all Israelis think has utterly bombed in his attempts to lead the nation. A ballot for Peres would have been a wistful (and probably wasted) affirmation of the "New Middle East" which never emerged after Labor-negotiated treaties were signed with the Palestinians and Jordan, and is hardly rising on the regional horizon.

Still, a vote for Ariel Sharon--the former army general and defense minister who is widely blamed for the protracted and controversial 1982 Lebanon War--is almost surely a vote for imminent war. The Arab world will predictably explode in violent anti-Israel frenzy and condemnation if he wins the top spot. Most world governments and the international media will certainly join in the venomous response, at least to some degree. The stage will be set for an indignant, and probably fiery reply from the entire Muslim world to the man whom they accuse of setting off the violent uprising by visiting near the Al Aksa Mosque on the Temple Mount in late September.

If the above assessment were even partially correct, why would any sane Israeli voter willingly choose the veteran Likud leader? Well for one thing, they cannot vote for Netanyahu if he is not a candidate. But more than that, many seem to have concluded that Israel is already at war, even if it is currently just a "low intensity conflict" as Armed Forces Chief Shaul Mofaz put it in December. Every day people on one side or the other--or both--are wounded and/or killed as the uprising goes on. Many nights the Israeli capital reverberates to the sound of armed clashes taking place on the southern edge of the sprawling city. Israeli school children living in the disputed territories travel to and from their classes in armored buses. And no one forgets that additional deadly terror attacks can occur anywhere at any moment. If these are attributes of peace, they are strange ones to say the least.

And then there is the very disturbing wider picture. Israeli voters read and hear news reports describing how Saddam Hussein's smiling face now graces the walls of many Palestinian buildings. The Butcher of Baghdad is hailed in the Palestinian media as someone likely to save the day in the very near future. Why should Israelis doubt that Saddam--who has moved two entire armored divisions to his western border with Syria and Jordan--would try to fulfill such flattering expectations? This is especially so after Israel's two television channels screened news reports showing the brutal dictator presiding over a parade of "holy war volunteers" in the Iraqi capital (the reports said Saddam's entire jihad force, established to "liberate Palestine," numbered several million men!)

The average voter also fully realizes that the Lebanese Hizbullah militia has not disappeared from along the northern border. They read reports in mid-December that the Iranian-backed militia has established over 30 heavily armed forward outposts since the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in May. Many are aware of published intelligence information revealing that Iranian jets are now flying directly into Beirut airport, via Iraqi and Syrian airspace, to deliver rockets that are possibly fitted with chemical warheads. They know that Syria has done nothing to stop the military buildup, but has instead encouraged it. They heard the head of Israeli army intelligence warn on December 21, "the prospects of renewed fighting along the border are not low."

Israeli voters read foreign media reports--undoubtedly based on local sources--that three new German-built Israeli submarines have been placed on full war alert, probably equipped with nuclear warheads. They are aware that Israel launched a "commercial" satellite in early December that can take precision pictures of whatever object on earth it is directed to photograph. These are all signs of looming conflict, not of a pending Peres-Barak peace utopia.

If the Arab-Muslim world has basically chosen war, say many Israelis, why not face that fact and deal with it in the best way possible? To many voters, the best way is a Sharon-led government that will truly "know how to deal" with Israel's many enemies. It would probably feature Ehud Barak as defense minister (a role he currently holds, although his daytime job gives it short shrift in many people's opinions) and Binyamin Netanyahu as foreign minister. The former Likud leader, who can legally serve in the cabinet even if he is not a member of the Knesset, would make an excellent foreign minister in the opinion of many pundits. A Sharon-led team featuring the two former premiers in supporting roles would not be bogged down by a preponderance of peace dreamers who have seemingly lost their ability to face unpleasant and ugly Mideast realities. It might be just the right trio to lead Israel through the stormy waters that apparently lie ahead.

FRESH OXYGEN OR FURTHER POISON?

Virtually all right-wing politicians cried foul over the hastily convened talks. They felt that the desperate Barak would give away almost anything to cling to power, no matter what the cost to Israel's vital security interests or to the unity of the Jewish people. Even worse, the snap negotiations in the wake of Barak's surprise resignation were being overseen by lame-duck Bill Clinton--a man whose earlier extramarital predilections are not only still quite humiliating (especially now that his cheated wife is about to outrank him in the halls of power), but probably contributed to Al Gore's slim presidential defeat. Many saw the combination of an apprehensive prime minister and a bruised president as a dangerous duo to be deciding Israel's fate at this portentous hour.

Right-wing fears of a pending sell-out seemed to be confirmed when a close political confidant of Barak's said that the government was prepared to forswear Jewish sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Speaking in New York just before Ben-Ami met with Clinton in Washington, Absorption Minister Yael Tamir said "Israel must make painful concessions, renouncing one way or another our sovereignty over the Temple Mount if necessary." Several American Zionist groups joined local right-wing legislators in denouncing her controversial statement, which all presumed must reflect the thinking of her cabinet superior.

Press reports said the deal that was discussed in the United States was essentially the same one that was loudly rejected by Yasser Arafat last July. The major differences were that Barak is now prepared to formally hand over effective sovereignty to the Palestinians over Judaism's most sacred site, along with adjacent Arab neighborhoods. He would also sweeten his previous land transfer offer, granting Arafat control over some 94% of the disputed territories (he already controls over 40%). This would mean abandoning even more Jewish settlements than envisioned in the rejected July proposal--an idea sure to meet fierce resistance in Israel. Barak would make up for the "missing" 6% that Arafat is demanding by handing over equal portions of land currently under Israeli sovereignty.

In exchange for being granted effective sovereignty over the two Islamic shrines on the Temple Mount (and apparently most of the Old City as well), the Palestinians would be asked to renounce all future "refugee right of return" claims. Refugees living in Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere would instead be encouraged to move to a future Palestinian state, or to accept financial compensation via a special fund set up by Israel and other countries.

Arafat has stood firm in insisting that over three million Palestinians be granted the right to move to their former, or ancestral homes inside Israel--an idea that almost all Israeli politicians reject as suicidal. Despite reports that negotiators in Washington had discussed the compromise proposal outlined above, many analysts warned that the aging Palestinian leader will probably not budge on this central demand since he would be met with open scorn, if not potential assassination, for giving up the cherished "right of return." The PLO leader was widely denounced as a villainous traitor by many regional Palestinians for even talking about such a concession during earlier negotiations.

IS THIS CHUTZPA OR WHAT?

Most left-wing Israeli peace advocates were thrilled that Barak ordered his surrogates back to the negotiating table, even if it was mainly due to election pressures. Many announced that Barak's "wise move" would spur them to work feverishly for the unpopular leader's return to power in the upcoming election campaign. If the diminutive Labor party chief did not rapidly deliver the peace goods, they made clear that they would still support him, but only because the alternative is the detested Sharon. Opinion polls showed that Israel's nearly half-million Arab voters, who overwhelmingly chose Barak in the last election, would back the premier with great reluctance even if he ironed out a peace accord with Arafat. If he did not sign on the dotted line, most said they would probably stay home on election day.

Many Jewish voters were clearly horrified at the prospect that their current besieged leader might sign a peace deal under such circumstances. Their feelings were summed up by Ariel Sharon. He said Barak, who lost his coalition majority when he went to Camp David last summer, has "no mandate to negotiate far-reaching concessions on the eve of elections."

Political analysts said any accord would probably be approved by the Knesset, if at all, by a mere one-vote margin, reflecting the 61-59 left-right split in the legislature. They said the Levy brothers would require severe coaxing to vote for the sort of peace accord that was apparently discussed in Washington, meaning it might well go down to defeat. If so, Israel would take all the international heat for "obstructing peace." Still, they warned that deciding Israel's future borders, the final status of Jerusalem, the dismantling of settlements and other crucial, volatile issues on the strength of a bare majority vote (and that based on the presumed support of ten anti-Zionist Arab Knesset members) would probably spark significant civil strife in Israel.

There is another major obstacle in Barak's way of winning popular and parliamentary approval for any last-minute peace pact: It would be clearly seen by many here as an outrageous reward for Arafat's attempt to produce further concessions through the barrel of a gun. Indeed, Palestinian cabinet minister Nabil Shaath openly stated as the Washington talks got going that they were the direct fruit of the violent Arab uprising, which had taken 40 Jewish lives by the time the negotiations began. Analysts noted that the peace talks alone constitute a blatant violation of Barak's own announcement that he was calling a negotiating "time-out" until the shooting stopped.

Ehud Barak is taking an enormous gamble by throwing the peace dice once again. If no accord is achieved during Bill Clinton's last weeks in office, or if one is arrived at and then barely ditched by the Knesset, he will be an even easier election target for both his far-left and Likud opponents. However, since the PM apparently has very little to lose at this point, he obviously decided that the dice were worth throwing, however loaded they may be against him.

WHAT IF SHARON WINS?

It is widely assumed in the international media that Arafat and company strongly prefer a Barak victory on February 6. Therefore the Palestinian leader is likely to bend over backwards to make a peace deal at this time, if only to prevent a Sharon win. But is this really the case? One can easily argue that the opposite is true. Arafat's popularity ratings were in the dumps this summer when it appeared he would compromise on at least some of his oft-repeated maximalist demands. Now, his public esteem rivals the "glory days" when he was carried atop willing shoulders by a cheering crowd during his triumphant entrance into the "liberated" Gaza Strip in 1994. The reason for his drastic change of fortune must be quite clear to the autocratic leader: He boldly stood up and said "no" to the Israeli and American leaders in July, and chose the path of "popular resistance" instead.

If Arafat has basically concluded that he cannot get a good enough peace deal in negotiations with any Israeli leader--which seems to be the case, given that a "good enough" deal for many Arabs is nothing less than Israel's agreement to completely self-destruct--then a Sharon victory may be exactly what he wants. It would goad Saddam to further pursue his declared jihad holy war against "the Zionist entity" supported by Syria and Iran, and possibly by Egypt and Jordan as well.

In conclusion, it seems that 2001 will be a tumultuous year at best. Any peace accord will produce ripples of unrest that could lead to assassinations and civil strife both in Israel and in the Palestinian zones--which may be officially declared a state early in the New Year. The lack of a peace deal, especially if it is accompanied by continuing violence and a Sharon victory, may ignite a regional war. In such momentous times, it is more than comforting to know and lean on the eternal Rock of Israel, the only source of lasting peace!

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