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Conventional Weapons Proliferation

TruthNews Special Report, January 2001

• U.S. Sales Exceeding $1 Billion Since 1994
• Bibliography

As noted in the above quote, the proliferation of conventional weapons is, in many ways, more dangerous than that posed by weapons of mass weapons destruction. Weapons of mass destruction remain primarily a hypothetical future threat, but the U.S. has fought several wars in the past decade against conventional weapons, and most defense funding remains focused on conventional weapons (16:91).

The purpose of this article is to examine the U.S. policies regarding proliferation of conventional weapons throughout the world and how these policies affected the competitive arms export market in the 1990s. Issues examined include the problems of market globalization, U.S. national security issues, regional balances of power, seller approval and responsibility, and the U.S. industrial base. The policies are analyzed in terms of how and why they exist and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness. Based on this assessment, recommendations for change are presented.

In this article, it will be demonstrated that the U.S. policies on conventional weapons proliferation are ineffective and counter to American national interests.

As noted above, despite much rhetoric, the U.S. arms control process has changed little during the past decade. However, the context in which the policy is being implemented has changed, as well as the emphasis that the different elements receive.

The key historical event that has occurred in the last decade to change the conventional arms proliferation was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Previously, arms transfers were played out in the context of the Cold War. The U.S. armed its friends and the Soviet Union armed its friends. Regimes of questionable stability or democratic values, such as Iran, were armed with front-line American equipment.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about four major changes to the conventional arms market. First, the end of the cold war brought about a substantial disarming in much of the free world, resulting in a reduced market for arms. Second, reduced market for arms in the U.S. resulted in the necessity to sell more arms overseas in order to maintain our defense industrial base. Third, sales to nations that were not close allies could no longer be judged in terms of whose side they were on in the cold war. As a result, the question of whether an arms sale to a third world country should be approved became more difficult to judge-today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy. Fourth, the collapse of Russia's economy has largely removed Russia as a major competitor for arms sales.

From its cold war peak in 1987 of $84B, the global arms market had decreased to $42.7B in 1996 (4:4). During this time, the U.S. share of the global arms market increased from 26% to 55%, so total U.S. arms sales increased slightly in this period from 21.8 billion to $23.5 billion (constant FY96 dollars), although year-to-year sales figures fluctuate. In addition, the most recent year figure may be understated because the U.S. arms exports have shifted somewhat from Foreign Military Sales (in which a U.S. system program office runs the sale) to direct commercial sales (in which the foreign government or a foreign company contracts directly with the U.S. company). Although the latter mechanism requires an export license, accounting of the exact volume of sales is more difficult, and thus the volume of sales for a given year tends to rise as more sales are reported for that year (11).

In 1996, the U.S. was the top arms exporter with sales nearly four times those of the next largest country (4). The top ten exporters in 1996 are shown in Table 1.

The significant arms importers are located primarily in the Middle East, East Asia, and Western Europe (4). The top ten importers in 1999 are shown in Table 2.

Since 1994, the U.S. has made 14 sales exceeding a billion dollars in value (10). These sales are primarily for aircraft and missiles and are detailed in Appendix A. In addition to aircraft and missiles, weapons in demand include tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, warships, and helicopters (4). Areas of concern to the U.S. with regard to regional stability include the Middle East, and Greece-Turkey, and the Far East, particularly China-Taiwan.

President Clinton's policy on conventional arms transfer was released in February 1995 (23:1). The purpose of the policy is two-fold: first, to support arms transfers to meet the security needs of the U.S., its friends, and its allies; and second, to restrain arms transfers that may be destabilizing to regional peace. The policy is also intended to promote control, restraint, and transparency of arms transfers, and support regional initiatives to enhance transparency in conventional arms transfers (24:2). Further, the policy states that the U.S. will push to increase participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Finally, the policy declares that the U.S. will act unilaterally where necessary to restrain the flow of arms.

Although the Clinton policy seeks to impose a measure of control on arms transfers by other countries, the emphasis in this area is on visibility of arms transfers, rather than actual prevention, so it is not clear whether this aspect of the Clinton policy has affected the world arms market. The UN Register of Conventional Arms, for example, is only a voluntary listing by countries of arms sales to other countries.

Arms exports from the United States are governed by the Arms Export Control Act which governs munitions items, and the Export Administration Act of 1979, which controls dual-use items (21:6).

The Arms Export Control Act requires that exports support U.S. national security interests and imposes three conditions on the recipient (15:1-3). First, the recipient must agree not to transfer the article to a third country without U.S. Government consent. Second, the recipient must agree not to use the article for a purpose other than intended without U.S. Government consent. Third, the recipient must agree to maintain the security of the article.

The Export Administration Act is implemented through the Commerce Control List, which details the dual-use items for which an export license is required.

The State Department is responsible for implementing the Arms Export Control Act. Controlled items are listed in the Munitions List. The Commerce Department is responsible for the Export Administration Act and controls items that fall on the Commerce Control List. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for identifying dual-use goods to be placed on the Commerce Control List (15:1-4).

The U.S. export control policies are similar to other countries with two exceptions. First, other countries are generally more willing to sell arms to third world countries (4). Notable exceptions are Japan, which as a result of the "peace constitution" instituted after the Second World War, does not sell weapons to other countries. In addition, Germany does not sell arms outside of NATO. A second major difference is that most foreign countries are less willing to transfer technology than is the U.S. In the view of most foreign countries, preserving a technology edge in key areas is essential to future arms sales.

The preceding quote illustrates how policy makers weigh considerations in developing U.S. policy guidelines. This section examines the issues that impact the formulation of U.S. policies and which issues take precedence and why.

The primary issues that impact arms proliferation policies are the impact of sales on U.S. domestic considerations, U.S. national security, and regional stability. In general, the first issue tends to encourage arms sales, while the second two are inhibitors.

The increased emphasis that the Clinton administration has placed on economic considerations when it comes to arms sales can be seen from the manner in which the policy was implemented. In 1993, Warren Christopher, wrote a letter in which he stated

The President stressed the critical importance of exports for job creation, growth in our economy, and overall competitiveness... The State Department will serve as an "American Desk" and that assisting American business will be at the top of our agenda. (6)

Similarly, William Perry, then Secretary of Defense, stated in 1995, "It is the general policy of the Department of Defense to encourage foreign governments to buy American defense related products..." (18)

The Clinton administration has encouraged arms exports in order to shore up the American economy. During the period 1980-1998, defense procurement funding declined 66 percent while defense industrial employment declined only 39 percent (16). It is clear that the increase in arms sales has been effective in preventing further decline in the defense industrial sector.

Arms sales, both of U.S. weapons and foreign weapons, can affect the U.S. national security by providing arms and transferring arms-manufacturing technology to potential enemies. The U.S. attempts to regulate shipment of U.S. arms through the Arms Export Control Act while dual use technology is regulated by the Export Administration Act. Technology transfer and sales of arms by other countries is monitored through the Wassenaar Arrangement and other similar arrangements.

The implementing regulations for the Arms Export Control Act are the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The ITAR contains the Munitions List, which details the munitions items that are controlled (15:1-3). Two types of weapons transfers are possible under the ITAR. First, the transfer can be by Foreign Military Sale (FMS) which is governed by the Security Assistance Management Manual (8:1). Foreign Military Sales are not required to have an export license, but the proposed FMS must be staffed through the Defense and State Departments and Congressional notification may be required. The other type of weapons transfer is the direct commercial sale, which requires an export license granted by the State Department.

The implementing regulations for the Export Administration Act are the Export Administration Regulations. The Export Administration Regulations contain the Commerce Control List detailing the dual-use items for which an export license is required. The Export Administration Act expired on September 30, 1990. Since expiration of the act, the regulations have been maintained under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by Executive Order 12924 (21:8). The Export Administration Act authorizes export controls for reason of national security in order to prevent diversion of sensitive technology to countries of concern. The primary method of control was through the COCOM and is now through the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Export Administration Act requires the President to establish a list of controlled countries for national security purposes. The controlled countries are the communist and former communist countries, including Russia and China (21:10). The Export Administration Act also authorizes export controls for reason of foreign policy (21:10). The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) falls under the foreign policy exemption. The MTCR, although primarily oriented toward delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction, also affects the export of tactical missile technology (19:18). However, the MTCR, like the Wassenaar Arrangement, is a voluntary protocol that has no international enforcement mechanism (19:2)

The elimination of the COCOM, the assignment of dual-use goods regulation to the Commerce Department, and the weak "visibility" requirements of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the MTCR reflect the priority that the Clinton administration has placed on arms sales over national security. The primary reason for the weakening of these international arrangements was to allow the U.S. to sell more arms without foreign intervention (20:14)

Regional stability concerns have obviously played a part in the Clinton arms control policies, and in fact these concerns have been a large part of every President's policy since the time of Jimmy Carter. Two cases will be discussed here, specifically the case of Israel and Egypt and the case of Greece and Turkey. From Appendix A, it can be seen that major arms transfers have been undertaken to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia, in fact, has bought both the F-15 fighter and the AWACS, which are not shown in Appendix A because these sales occurred prior to 1994 (9). While Greece appears prominently in Appendix A and Turkey does not, the U.S. has armed Turkey extensively through giveaways of surplus equipment as well as grants and loans (12).

Israel and Egypt have been enemies since the time of the exodus in approximately 1500 BC. The Bible records three incidents in which Egyptian pharaohs defeated Israel. Both nations ceased to exist when they were incorporated into the Roman Empire, but both nations were reestablished in the Twentieth Century and, in the first 25 years of Israel's existence, fought four wars. In 1948, the U.S. and Israel signed a treaty of mutual military assistance. Since then, the U.S. has backed Israel with substantial military aid and weapons. Egypt, on the other hand, was a Soviet client state for much of the Cold War. It was not until the Camp David accords in 1979 that Egypt began receiving U.S. military aid (17:1). In exchange for signing a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt received the Sinai peninsula from Israel (captured by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967), reopened the Suez Canal, and became the recipient of massive U.S. military aid currently totaling $1.8 billion annually along with the right to purchase the finest U.S. military equipment including the F-16 fighter, LANTIRN pods, and the M-1 tank.

The military aid that Egypt receives is second only to Israel, and over 80 percent of all U.S. military aid goes to the two countries. However, unlike Israel, which is a well-established democracy that shares our values and culture, Egypt is a brutal dictatorship that has more in common with their previous Soviet suppliers than with America. The only reason that the U.S. supplies the Egyptian war machine is to maintain regional stability. However, in this case, the U.S. promotes regional stability by arming both nations, and the peace between the two nations is similar to the peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Like Israel and Egypt, Greece and Turkey have been enemies for thousands of years. Greece was briefly a great power under Alexander the Great, and succeeded in planting its culture throughout the Mediterranean area, but has not been a significant military or economic power since. Although the birthplace of democracy, Greece has been ruled for much of the Twentieth Century by kings and military dictators. Turkey, on the other hand, inherited much of the Roman Empire's eastern holdings, and a succession of Turkish dynasties ruled the Middle East up until World War I. However, Turkey made the mistake of siding with Germany during World War I, and the Ottoman Empire was subsequently dissolved with Turkey's defeat. Modern Turkey was founded as a secular democracy, but has drifted into dictatorship and Moslem extremism on occasion.

Turkey and Greece were admitted into NATO at the same time, but have fought over the island of Cyprus, which has a majority Greek population but a large Turkish minority. Tensions have also been exacerbated by the fact that Greece is a member of the European Union, while Turkey is not.

Regional stability considerations have played a large part in arms dealings with Greece and Turkey. Both countries have been the recipients of substantial U.S. arms transfers. Turkey, in particular, which shared a border with the Soviet Union, was a recipient of surplus U.S. equipment which was transferred to Turkey for free. Unlike the situation with Israel and Egypt, the U.S. has been more restrained, denying both countries arms that could lead to escalation of conflict. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, arms transfers to Turkey have been with the ostensible goal of preserving regional stability.

As with Egypt, Turkey shares little of American values. Since 1970, Turkey has been engaged in an internal war against a Kurdish minority. Many of the U.S.-supplied weapons have been used against the Kurds in violation of U.S. prohibitions on using U.S. weapons for population suppression.

The Clinton policy has clearly emphasized domestic considerations, principally the economic impact of arms sales, over other factors. As can be seen in Table 3, the goals of the Clinton policy are similar to President Reagan's policy which was issued in July 1981 (14:1-2):

The fact that the Reagan policy did not seek to promote peaceful conflict resolution does not appear significant since the implementation of the Clinton policy has also not emphasized this aspect. However, the goal of enhancing the U.S. industrial capability at lower cost has been a key element of the Clinton policy and drives many of the changes that have occurred in U.S. arms exports.

The comparison in Table 4 of the Clinton and Reagan criteria on whether to allow an arms transfer reveals little substantive difference between the two policies.

It can be seen that the Clinton policy emphasizes human rights, third party transfers, and proliferation to a greater degree than did the Reagan policy; however these differences appear insignificant in the practical applications. The Clinton administration's emphasis on the impact on the U.S. industrial base and availability of foreign comparable systems, however, has had a greater impact on arms sales.

The U.S. remains the world's largest arms exporter, so how effective are our arms control policies? This section discusses the effectiveness of U.S. policies along with policy shortcomings. Four areas are discussed: costs, threats to national security, U.S. public support, and military readiness.

The Clinton policy has been successful in reducing the costs of military readiness. Arms sales reduce the unit costs of U.S. military articles and keep production lines open. Export sales have sustained several production lines, including the F-15, F-16, M-1 tank, and AH-64 helicopter (6). Cooperative research and development efforts have also saved money. Since 1991, the projects funded through the International Cooperative Research and Development Program have saved the U.S. $865 million (13:8-44).

However, while it is clear that costs have been reduced in the short term, it is not clear whether a similar claim can be made for the long term. The U.S. has sold or given foreign countries our best equipment, such as the F-15, F-16, AMRAAM, and LANTIRN. Many of these countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, have questionable stability and may be tomorrow's enemies. When we sell these countries our best equipment, we are then required to develop new equipment that is even better in order to be able to defeat these countries if we are ever in a war with them. In the long term, then, selling arms in order to keep our unit cost down is self-defeating, because we must then spend more money to develop and purchase better equipment.

U.S. arms transfers have generally been limited to countries that are either friendly to the U.S. or do not pose a direct threat to the U.S. However, in the area of dual use technology (technology that has both military and civilian applications, such as computers and jet engines), the Clinton administration is considerable more lenient than previous administrations. Prior to 1994, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control (COCOM) governed the export of arms and dual use technology. COCOM was made up of the NATO countries plus Japan and Australia (21:11-12). Under COCOM, any member nation could veto an export by another COCOM nation. The Clinton administration abolished COCOM and replaced it with the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement, formally established in July 1996, is a voluntary export visibility regime whose 33 members, mostly arms exporting nations that are friendly to the U.S., exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies.

The Wassenaar Arrangement does not allow U.S. intervention to veto technology transfer by other nations. In addition, the U.S. has not been entirely effective in controlling its own technology transfer. The Cox Committee found that the U.S. had transferred both jet engine technology and machine tool technology to China, in addition to the missile technology that spurred the report (21:84).

Because of the economic benefits, the U.S. public is generally indifferent to arms sales, provided the sales are not to a dictatorship that uses the equipment to suppress the country's population. However, at best, arms sales have a neutral effect on public support of the U.S. military. No member of the American pubic has ever supported the U.S. military because of an arms sale. However, unpopular arms sales can decrease public support of the military, particularly when the sales are carried out by the U.S. military through Foreign Military Sales, when the U.S. finances the purchase, or when training and logistics support is involved (as it almost always is with FMS).

Although U.S. military readiness has declined over the past decade, arms sales have generally had a positive impact on military readiness. This has been the result of two factors. First, as noted previously, arms sales tend to decrease the cost of arms to the U.S. Second, arms sales to allies help to ensure that their equipment is compatible and interoperable with ours. However, as noted previously, helping arm potential can have negative effects. Is it better to have a large force facing an enemy as well equipped as ours, or a smaller force that is better equipped than the enemy? Since military transport is often the limiting factor in how large a force can be fielded, it is probably better to ensure that the enemy is not as well equipped as the U.S.

In this article, it was demonstrated that the U.S. policies on conventional weapons proliferation are ineffective and counter to American national interests.

The Clinton administration has emphasized arms sales as a way to reduce the costs of U.S. weapons acquisition and to sustain the exports that fuel the economy. In addition, in order to share the cost of research and development efforts U.S. technology has been transferred to foreign countries. This technology will help these countries to make better weapons in the future. While arms exports can reduce costs in the short term, in the long term our enemies will field better equipped forces, thus requiring the U.S. to spend more money to maintain U.S. superiority.

The following changes are recommended to U.S. arms transfer policies:

• Cease all trade with communist countries. Any country that is dedicated to the destruction of the United States should be treated as an enemy. In wartime, the U.S. has not traded with its enemies, and the situation should not be different in the current situation. This will stop the transfer of U.S. technology that countries such as China seek to use against us.
• Cease arms transfers to dictatorships. Dictatorships are inherently unstable both in government and in friendships. We should not sell arms to countries that may use them against us.
• Reduce technology giveaways through cooperative development efforts. Even countries that are purportedly friendly to the U.S. are also our rivals for arms and commercial sales. The United States spends more in research and development than all the rest of NATO combined, so cooperative development efforts are hardly the two-way street that they are commonly portrayed as.

Congress should pass laws requiring the above changes. This is consistent with Article I of the Constitution which empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign Nations (22).

Source: (10)

1. "Arms Sales Decline Globally But U.S. Still Leads," New York Times, August 6, 1999.

2. "Clinton's Conventional Arms Export Policy: So Little Change," Arms Control Today, May 1995.

3. Arms Control Association. "The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies." Washington DC: Arms Control Association, December 15, 1998

4. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1997.

5. Center for Defense Information. Arms Transfer Project, April 16, 1999.

6. Christopher, Warren. Speech, April 7, 1993.

7. Cohen, William J. "DoD International Armaments Cooperation Policy." Memo. Washington DC: Department of Defense, March 23, 1996.

8. DoD 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," Washington DC: Department of Defense, October 1, 1988.

9. Federation of American Scientists, "U.S. Arms Clients Profiles-Saudi Arabia," July 2000 .

10. Federation of American Scientists, "U.S. Arms Sales or Giveaways: 1994-Present," April 28, 2000.

11. Federation of American Scientists, "World Wide Arms Transfer Dollars, FH 1990-1997," August 31, 1999.

12. Federation of American Scientists, "U.S. Arms Clients Profiles-Turkey," January 18, 2001.

13. The International Cooperative Research and Development Program: Achieving Superior 21^st Century Defense Capabilities, Arlington VA: Strategic Analysis, Inc, 1997.

14. National Security Council. "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," NSDD 5. Washington DC: White House, July 8, 1981.

15. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Support), International Programs Security Handbook, Washington DC: Department of Defense, April 1988.

16. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2000. Washington DC: Department of Defense, March 1999.

17. Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, March 26, 1979.

18. Perry, William. Speech, July 21, 1995.

19. Schmidt, Rachel, U.S. Export Control Policy and the Missile Technology Control Regime, RAND Report P-7615-RGS, Santa Monica CA: RAND, January 1990.

20. Select Committee, United States House of Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Volume 1, Washington DC: U.S. House of Representatives, January 3, 1999.

21. Select Committee, United States House of Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Volume 3. Washington DC: U.S. House of Representatives, January 3, 1999.

22. The United States Constitution, On-line. Internet, 1789, Available from TruthNews.

23. White House. "Statement by the White House Press Secretary on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy." Washington DC: White House Press Secretary, February 17, 1995.

24. White House. "Fact Sheet: Conventional Arms Transfer Policy." Washington DC: White House Press Secretary, February 17, 1995.

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